Introduction
In his book on Natiorts and nationalism since 1780, E.J. Hobsbawm concludes that "the phenomenon [of nationalism] is past its peak." (p. 183) Before he gets to this conclusion (apparently written some time in 1989, still before German reunification became a realistic possibility and before the process of fragmentation in some countries of the old Communist Bloc had gained momentum) he shows quite convincingly, and almost prophetically, that a new 'Europe of nations' in the Wilsonian sense (with independent entities such as Catalonia, Corsica, Slovenia, Estonia, etc.) could not produce 'a stable or lasting political system.' (p. 177) For one thing, "the first thing most such hypothetical new European states would do is, almost certainly, apply for admission to the European Economic Community, which would once again limit their sovereign rights, [...] ." (p. 177) Indeed, nation-states with highly autonomous 'national economies' probably belong to the past. However, it is far from clear that such a confrontation with economic reality, which will no doubt change the historical content and direction of nation-building processes, has any direct influence on nationalism from an ideological perspective. After all, as Hobsbawm demonstrates equally convincingly, the essence of nationalism from the 19th century onwards has been the definition of imagined communities'along conceptual lines out of touch with 'objective reality' (a theme also developed in Barth ed. 1982 and by Anderson 1983 ).
An assessment of the ideological processes involved requires access to 'the view from below.' But, 'That view from below, i.e. the nation as seen not by governments and the spokesmen and activists of nationalist (or non-nationalist) movements, but by the ordinary persons who are the objects of their action and propaganda, is exceedingly difficult to discover." (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 11) This is further complicated by the fact that ' This paper was written in the context of a research program supported by the Belgian National
Fund for Scientific Research (NFWO/FKFO), the Belgian National Lottery and a Belgian government grant (IUAP-ll, contract number 27). Thanks are due to Gino Eelen, who mllected the data we needed, to l,ouis Goossens, Johan van der Auwera, Michael Meeuwis, Luisa Martin Rojo, Bambi Schieffelin, Kit Woolard and Paul Kroskrity for comments on an earlier version, and to Susan Philips for the insightful remarks she made during the discussion at the AAA meeting where this paper was presented.
" [...] national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods." (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 11) Hobsbawm adds that "this is the area of national studies in which thinking and research are most urgently needed today." (p.11) To counterbalance the remark about the 'exceeding difficulty' of the research in question, he observes:
"Fortunately social historians have learned how to investigate the history of ideas, opinions and feelings at the sub-literary level, so that we are today less likely to confuse, as historians once habitually did, editorials in select newspapers with public opinion. ' (p. 11) This paper is intended to contribute (i) to the further exploration of the topic identified in the above quotations, and (ii) to the development of an adequate methodology to approach the complexities of ideology research.
As to its topic, this paper is to be situated in the context of a wider research project intended to provide a historical snapshot of mainstream European thinking about nations and national identification. The main data base consists of a comprehensive collection of articles on ethnic conflicts (whether intra-or internationally), separatist and unificational movements, and other topics --such as minority politics --involving issues of group identity associated with 'nationality,'
from the mainstream daily press in at least 80Vo of the countries of Europe (both East and West), over a three-month period in 1991. Though the period itself may not be long enough for observable ideological changes to take place, the temporal demarcation will make it possible to draw historical comparisons with welldocumented periods from the past; moreover, similar snapshots can be taken at any time in the future. From a methodological point of view, the nature of the data base might raise some worries directly related to Hobsbawm's remark concerning the earlier habits of historians 'to confuse editorials in select newspapers with public opinion.' There are three ways in which the project avoids this problem. First, the selection criterion for choosing the newspapers to be investigated has been that they should be mainstream publications which, together, have a maximal readership, but each of which has a different target audience. Smallcirculation publications have been avoided because they are most likely to represent the opinions of a few people.z In practice, extremist texts (in any direction) have, as a result, rarely entered the corpus, though --depending on one's perspective --extremism of some kind may turn out to be the norm under certain circumstances and in some geographical areas.
Second, the investigation pays equal attention to regular news reports and editorials (which are more openly subject to personal interpretation and bias); the character of the texts is fullv taken into account whenever conclusions are drawn from examples.
Third, and most importantly, more weight is attached to the implicit frame of reference, the supposedly common world of beliefs in which the reports (or the editorial comments) are anchored, than to the explicit statements made by the reporters (or commentators). This approach is crucial for the investigation of widely shared ideologies. And fortunately modern linguistics, in particular linguistic pragmatics, provides us with fully adequate tools to undertake exactly this kind of study. Briefly, the basic assumptions are (i) that the authors, just like any other language user in any other communicative context, are unable to express what they want to communicate in a fully explicit way, (ii) that therefore their texts leave implicit most of the assumptions they expect their readers to share with them, and (iii) that a careful analysis of those implicit assumptions will reveal a common frame of reference or 'ideology.' It follows that isolated examples are never sufficient as evidence: coherence --manifested either as recurrence or as svstematic absence --is necessary to warrant conclusions. 3 This article is based on a smaller pilot study in which some Northwest European dataa were scrutinized in view of the specific role which language plays in the overall picture of current nationalist ideologies. It goes without saying that our findings will have to be interpreted in the light of the regional restrictions on the corpus, a remark which should be kept in mind whenever we use the qualification 'European'"
Language as a distinctive feature
The sigpificance of a non-issue
As a surface topic, worthy of an explicit treatment in its own right, language is strikingly absent in our corpus of reports on interethnic conflicts or on issues of 'national' identity or nation-building. But tar from undermining any attcmpt to reveal a specific role for language in current nationalist ideologies from the start, this first observation has turned out to touch the very essence of popular linguistic ideology. Language is raised to the level of an individual issue almost exclusively when reference is made to societies other than the one in which the report in question is itself to be situated. A case in point is a German report entitled Ameika wtd Einwa ndenury: Sc hme lztiegel oder S alatschiissel? [America and immigration: Melting 3 A more elaborate justification of this approach is to be found in J. Blommaert & J. Verschueren (1991) .
o Most of the data used for this specific study date back to the first weeks of November 1990, but they are not strictly confined to that period. The investigated publications are: Die Zeit, Zeit Magazin, Der Spiegel, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Frankfuner Allgemeine Magazin; The Guardian, The Guardian Weekly; NRC Handelsblad; Le Monde, Le Nouvel Observateur; De Standaard. For the sake of comparison, one non-European source (though clearly 'Western' if not specifically American, and widely read in Europe), The Intemational Herald Tibune, was studied for the same period. As will be clear from the examples, the general tendency turned out to be very similar.
pot or salad bowl?], juxtaposed to an article on a dispute over voting rights at the municipal level for minority members in Germany. Though the physical juxtaposition of the two articles is clearly based on a judgment of topical relatedness, the German issue is phrased exclusively in terms of the sharing of political power and the possible infringement of ethnic German rights, whereas language is explicitly focused on as an issue in the US:
"Heute schon spielen sich harte Kiimpfe um die Sprache, um die Dominanz des Englischen ab, das vorldufig noch eine verbindende Kraft darstellt." (Die Zeit, 9 Nov. 1990, p. 7) [Already today difficult battles are fought over language, the dominance of English, which --for the time being --still presents a uni$ing force.]
The Official English movement is indeed a sufficiently interesting phenomenon to deserve special mention in connection with the multiethnicity of the United States.s But implicit in this German report is the idea that the coherence of a society strongly benefits from the existence of just one language. It is not accidental that the quoted sentence follows an explicit statement to the effect that "Die ethnisch-rassische Kocxistenz scheint zu gelingen solanle die Wirtschaft einigermassen floriert." lEthnic-racial coexistence seems to work as long as the economy is somewhat successful.]
Linguistic strife is presented as an important force towards social disintegration, triggered by a worsening economy. Because of the need for linguistic coherence, German as the only language of Germany is taken for granted. The issue, which is in reality as acute as in the American case (though there is not one single 'threatening'alternative such as Spanish in the US), does not need to be mentioned. Thus, treating language as a non-issue in relation to German minority problems, only reveals how much is really taken for granted. The feature clustering underlying group identification is such a powerful cognitive mechanism that knowledge about one feature is assumed to be enough, especially when it concerns language. As a result, groups that are distinguished solely on the basis of a distinct language are often treated as 'real' ethnic groups. And as such, they can be presented as being involved in inter-ethnic conflicts, even if their unity along the other parameters of the expected feature cluster does not stand up to scrutiny:
"[rs violences entre Moldaves et russophones <...>." ([, Monde, 6 Nov. 1990, p. 8) pne violence between Moldavians and Russian-speakers <...>I
In this report, 'Russian-speakers' (referred to alternatingly as minoit€ russe or minoritt russophone) are placed on a par with the Moldavians and the Gagauz.Here we see the dynamics of feature clustering at work. Though 'Russians' (the leastpreferred denominator in this report) could be reasonably assumed to share some common aspects of ethnicity, 'Russian-speakers' can obviously be no more than a residual category, an extremely heterogeneous group of people who may come from all over the Soviet Union, united only by the fact that they speak Russian (though it is certain that not all of them speak it as their mother tongue, and though even this feature does not clearly distinguish them from the other groups, as will be shown below), and by the fact that they cannot be labeled as ethnic Moldavians or Gagauz. But nevertheless the'Russian-speakers' are presented, in direct opposition with Moldavians and Gagauz, as an equally solid ethnic unit.
This misrepresentation of the social formations involved in the conflict clearly hampers a fair understanding of what goes on in Moldavia: by applying familiar categories, the impression of clear understanding is created while in fact neither the authors nor the readers of the articles have any familiarity with the people talked about. This is further illustrated by another characteristic of our data: after language has been introduced as a categorizing criterion, distinctive features other than language may be dragged in as soon as they are known, irrespective of whether in reality they play an identi$ing or distinguishing role or not. This leads to strange descriptions such as the following. Thus our data show the emergence of religion as a further identiffing feature of the Gagauz a few days after the first reports, though christianity in itself is precisely not a minority trait in Moldavia.
It may even be more surprising that this language-based identification is maintained though the distinguishing trait is almost in the same breath denied or downplayed.
"They [the Moldavians] claim the Gagauz are strongly Russianised; most speak Russian rather than Turkish and support Russian interests." (The Guardian, 1 Nov. 1990, p. 4) Though this again casts doubt on the legitimacy of a movement (centered around people who have betrayed themselves by adopting another language), we'll come back to this example below to demonstrate further aspects of the linguistic framing of nationalism.
Before going on, let us briefly point out that the clustering of language, descent, history, culture and religion, the strength of which we have been trying to demonstrate, is even extended to economic position. Remember the following quote:
"Die ethnisch-rassische Koexistenz scheint zu gelingen solange die Wirtschaft einigermassen floriert." (Die Zeit, 9 Nov. 1990, p.7) [Ethnic-racial mexistence seems to work as long as the economy is somewhat successful.]
The relationship between (multi-)ethnicity and economic prosperity is a topic which deserves more than the few lines we can spend here. In general, there seems to be an intuitive, almost automatic, association between the rise of nationalism and economic problems. Thus a weak economy is a much favored excuse for manifestations of racism. But if economic factors can trigger interethnic conflicts, ethnic groups must be seen as socio-economically undifferentiated wholes which act and react en masse under economic pressure.' The economy, which may soothe slumbering interethnic conflicts in times of general prosperity, is seen as flexible and unstable, whereas ethnicity is seen as a stable and timeless element of social stratification, a stratification which largely coincides with socio-economic differences.
The dffirent faces of homogeneism
Since the discontinuities --to pursue the lexical semantics metaphor further --are t The main exception to this rule seems to be the attempt, in official European rhetoric, to explain away racism and to preserve the European self-image of tolerance by demonstrating that expressions of racism are restricted to the lower socio-economic classes and that a weak socioeconomic status is itself the cause. (See Blommaert & Verschueren 1991.) But this is just one manifestation of another rule: that it is easier to perceive significant distinctions in one's own group than in other groups. The phenomenon indicated here also explains the occurrence, in our restricted corpus, of a long article (lilider die falschen Apostel, Die 7,eit,9 Nov. 1990, pp. 54-56) in which an attempt is made to define 'normal nationalism,' and in which economic problems are presented as a risk factor which may transform normal nationalism into xenophobia. defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions which are so strongly clustered that even one of them may be sufficient to characterize a group entity, homogeneity (emphasizing the necessity of the necessary and sufficient conditions) is the norm within the discontinuities (i.e. the 'nations' or 'peoples') thus defined.
Since such a view is so obviously naive, adherence to it would be most passionately denied by the authors of most of the reports discussed when challenged about this. But here we touch upon a deeply engrained dogma which is very coherently --though mostly implicitly --present in discourse about interethnic conflicts. Elsewhere (in Blommaert & Verschueren 1991) we have called it the dogma of homogeneism: a view of society in which differences are seen as dangerous and centrifugal, and in which the 'best' society is suggested to be one without intergroup differences.
In other words, the ideal model of society is mono-lingual, mono-ethnic, mono-religious, mono-ideological. Nationalism, interpreted as the struggle to keep groups as 'pure' and homogeneous as possible, is considered to be a positive attitude within the dogma of homogeneism. Pluri-ethnic or pluri-lingual societies are seen as problem-prone, because they require forms of state organization that run counter to the 'natural' characteristics of groupings of people. This dogma appears to dominate Belgian (and European) immigrant policies (again, see Blommaert & Verschueren 1991) , and --as will be further demonstrated below --it is used as an interpretive frame (with the Soviet Union as evidence and example) even for situations outside of Europe in our corpus:
"Wie in die Sowjetunion stellt sich auch in Indien die frage, ob ein Riesenreich, das aus derartig vielen ethnischen, religiosen, sprachlichen und kulturellen Splittern zusammengesetzt ist, zusammengehalten werden kann." (Die Zeit,16 Nov. 1990, p. 11) [As in the Soviet Union, the question also poses itself for India whether a giant empire consisting of such a plethora of ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural fragments can be held together.l
The conceptual systematicity with which the norm of homogeneity turns language itself into an interethnic battlefield will be discussed in section 3. of this paper. Though the norm of homogeneity is demonstrably present across Europe, the criteria along which homogeous nations are defined differ substantially. lrt us briefly look at some of the different forms of expression the norm can take. We find it in its purest ethnic form in the German press, where das Volk is systematically contrasted with die Bevolkerurg: the people vs. the population. For instance, the caption accompanying a picture with Turkish immigrants reads: "Soll nur das Volk oder die Bevolkerung auf kommunaler Ebene politisch mitentscheiden di.irfen? Ttirken auf einem SPD-fest in Berlin-Kreuzberg." (Die Zeit, 9 Nov. 1990, p.7) lSnould only the people or the population participate in political decisions at the municipal level? Turks at a SPD-meeting in Berlin-Kreuzberg.l
Overtly, a clear position of tolerance is advocated:
"Deutschland wird, wie in der Geschichte schon oft, die Ausliinder, die gekommen sind und bleiben wollen, 'integrieren."' (FranKurter Allgemeine, In the context of this article, the author does not leave any doubt that those /essr umrissene Einheiten are nation-states, the homogeneity of which should not be broken: to the extent that immigrants are tolerable as participants in social and political life, they have to be 'integrated.'
But it is exactly at this juncture that the paradox --or the deadly logic --of a nationalist ideology becomes clear. The definition of das Volk in terms of a feature cluster makes 'integration'impossible, as much as it requires that process. As soon as an Einwohner or member of the Bevolkerung has adapted to one parameter of Germanhood, any other feature may be arbitrarily focused on to preserve the difference. Thus language is only one feature in the cluster. Just as German Jews (even if indistinguishable in other respects) lacked the proper genetics, any migrant worker fluent in German and respecting all German laws and rules of public life, may still be stuck with the wrong descent, historical background, looks, religion: he or she cannot become a member of das Volk; his or her presence inevitably breaks the 'natural groupings' of people, the homogeneity of nations, the strictly separable units needed for democracy. Just consider the categories introduced in the following sentence:
" German emigrants) are immediately defined as belonging to das Volk. The second group will probably never make it: their children will be second-generation immigrants, not really gebilnige Deutsche. In contrast to the German emphasis on an ethnic definition of. das Volk (in terms of language, descent, culture, etc.), the French version of homogeneism stresses the importance of territoriality. The difference in emphasis has clear historical roots. The German quest for a nation-state was considerably facilitated by the spread of German dialects across a large part of Europe. Though only few people actively used a common language of culture, politically the geographical area in question had been so fragmented that language was not only a useful, but virtually the only possible, focus for unity. Moreover, by the time of German unification in the second half of the nineteenth century, European nationalism was taking a linguistic turn (expressed, i.a., in the insertion of a language question in national censuses). By contrast, when France needed to identify le peuple after the French revolution, the French language was no more than an administrative means for state-wide communication, a language which was shared (even in its dialectal variants) by less than 50 Va of the population. As a result, the search for selfidentification led to a reification of France itself as a natural and indivisible entity, the French 'people' consisting of everyone living in its territory. Though from the Here again we find a fundamental paradox of nationalism: though grounded in the observation of 'existing' differences, once a separate entity has been defined, nationalism is unable to recognize the legitimacy of any smaller-scale (or larger) group identities.8 The data from the British press contain remarkably few references to ethnic or linguistic diversity within Britain. Still, one small article in The Guardian (entitled Welsh militants utge supporters to breed children 'for the cause') tells a lot. In this article, a meeting of Welsh nationalists is reported. One of their leaders is said to have pleaded for Welshmen to have as many children as possible, so as to perpetuate the Welsh language, in the following terms:
"If you cannot speak Welsh, you carry the mark of the Englishman with you every day. That is the unpleasant truth." (The Guardian, 12 Nov. 1990, p. 1) Objectively, this is strong radical statement, revealing a degree of fanaticism mostly associated with radical nationalists. The meeting could, therefore, easily be taken seriously. But the opposite happens. The tone of the entire article is mildly ironical. The proposal to breed children in order to perpetuate the Welsh language is ridiculed. Moreover, the article ends with the suggestion that this proposal is reminiscent of the German Nazi 'Mutterkre\z' --a suggestion which is strongly rejected by the speaker. But even this comparison, grave as it may sound on the surface, is basically ironic. Nationalism (or even more generally, ethnic diversity), at least within the UK, is treated as folklore: it is not to be taken seriously as a political movement in Britain. Welsh activists are sketched as picturesque, romantic people, who cherish old customs and values in a harmless way --harmless because of the strength of the centralized, English-speaking state. In Belgium, homogeneism is most manifest in the domain of immigrant politics. That the Flemish and the Walloons run their own business, quite separately, is taken for granted (to the point where even arms sales can become a regional matter). Real problems of diversity (and the resulting destabilization) are caused only by the presence of immigrants from Maghrebine or Mediterranean descent. Although the presence of these foreign elements in Belgian society is officially declared to be a form of 'cultural enrichment' (invoking a suggestion of tolerance and openness from the Belgian side), a detailed analysis (see Blommaert & Verschueren 1991) reveals that Belgian society wants to be 'enriched' only in domains such as exotic cuisine, exotic music and dance --in sum, folklore. Socially, culturally, and linguistically, if not religiously, immigrants should 'integrate' or deethnicize themselves, to the point where, as one government party's policy document on immigrants states, "Migrants should become Flemish." An intriguing side-effect, but one which cannot be elaborated within the scope of this paper, is the observation that in the discourse about immigrants in Belgium, the age-old division between Flemish and Walloons seems to vanish. The formulation of an attitude towards immigrant minorities has caused the (re)construction of a common Belgian " Uli Windisch (1990) reports that Swiss nationalism has the same profile as French nationalism, being based necessarily --because of the diversity of the people living in the country --on territoriality. Thus Swiss nationalists cannot understand Jura separatism because 'The only sociological division they recognise is that based on national frontiers: '[within Switzerland] there aren't any frontiers, we're all Swiss'.' (p. 57) identity, thus allowing two clearly defined (and supposedly homogeneous) groups to form the core structure of a Belgian immigrant policy: 'Belgians' as opposed to 'lmmigrants. ' Needless to say that neither is, or has ever been, a homogeneous group.
Of nations and tribes
Very little disagreement seems to exist with regard to the reality of 'nations' in Europe. As demonstrated above, the'nation'is presented as a natural, objective and almost biological unit. People are divided on the basis of sex, age, and nation. In spite of the general tendency in our data to accept the existence --in 'reality' --of 'nations,' explicit statements on the subject are rare. Treating this reality as selfevident effectively hides the fact that it rarely stands up to scrutiny. A potentially classical example to disprove the existence of objective criteria of nationhood is a comparison between the Serbs and the Croats on the one hand, and the Flemish and the Dutch on the other. In the Serbian-Croat case, existing linguistic differences (underscored by a different orthography) have become highly symbolic for the discontinuity, whereas in the Flemish-Dutch case (where the linguistic differences are of almost exactly the same type and degree) language is the main symbol of cultural unity. On all other counts, the differences are completely analogous as well: e.g., history (Ottoman rule for Serbia vs. Spanish rule for Flanders, resulting in long periods of political separation from Croatia and Holland, respectively); religion (Orthodox vs. Catholic in the one case, Catholic vs. Protestant/Calvinist in the other). In spite of its obviousness, not a single observation of this kind can be found in the corpus.
Interestingly, in the two explicit statements on the reality of nations which we have been able to find (one inside, and one outside the restricted corpus which is the starting point for the discussion in this article), a comparison is volunteered between nations or peoples in Europe and 'tribes.' Consider the following observation from a Belgian newspaper:
"Tijdens zijn jongste bezoek aan Duitsland heeft President Mitterrand met die Franse hooghartigheid die niet zelden wortelt in een gebrekkige dossierkennis, minachtend gewaarschuwd voor een 'Europe des tribus'. Maar of dat het Franse staatshoofd nu bevalt of niet, het is een feit dat die 'volksstammen'bestddn, erkenning, zeggenschap en een eigen plaats eisen in het Europa dat naar vereniging streeft." (De Standaard, 27 Sept. 1991, p. 10) [During his recent visit to Germany, President Mitterrand, displaying that French sense of superiority which is not rarely based on being ill-informed, has warned with disdain . against a 'Europe of tribes.' But whether the French Head of State likes it or not, it is a fact that these 'tribes'exist, that they demand recognition, political participation and a place of their own in the Europe which is trying to reach unity.l
The term 'tribes' has a clear connotation of primitivism and naturalness in this context. And while Mitterrand's use of the term may be seen as ironic, the reaction from the journalist supports the view on nationalism as based on a need for identities analogous to groupings which are supposed to have come about quite naturally and instinctively in the less developed regions of the world. The author uses history as the ultimate argument for'the reality of the nations of Europe. These nations (Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldavia, Croatia etc.) do not emerge as responses to concrete political or socio-economic situations --they were always there, but they were suppressed by totalitarian state systems (see section 3. below). Their reality is historical, and therefore objectively real. The same comparison, though in the opposite direction, is made in the opinion columns of the NRC Handelsblad (7 Nov. 1990, p. 9) . The author, a professor of anthropology, argues against the European view of African 'tribes' as homogeneous, traditionalistic groups with rigid group boundaries. An explicit comparison with European nations or 'peoples'is not at all central to this well-taken argument. In the text itself it is introduced only indirectly: "In Europa, zo zeggen Afrikanen, spreekt men van volken; als men het over Afrika heeft gebruikt men het woord stammen. Daarmee is weer bevestigd hoe primitief Afrika is." (NRC Handelsblad, T Nov. 1990, p. 9) [In Europa, Africans say, peoples are talked about; but as soon as Africa is the subject, the word tribes is used. This serves to reconfirm how primitive Africa is.l But, maybe as a result of editorial intervention, the comparison is presented as the main focus of attention in the title: "Wat in Afrika stammen heet, wordt in Europa als 'volkeren'getypeerd."
[What is called tribes in Africa, is characterized as'peoples' in Europe.]
Furthermore, by stressing that the view of African tribes which he argues against, is a decidedly 'European' view, the author implicitly communicates that the properties he rejects for those African tribes are genuine properties of European 'peoples' or 'nations.' Moreover, that similar 'nations' exist in Africa is made abundantly clear by stressing the unity of Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda, in terms of a familiar feature cluster:
"Zij leven door elkaar als leden van €6n samenleving, bezitten 66n en dezelfde cultuur en spreken 66n taal." [They live together in one society, possess one and the same culture and speak one language.]
Thus again the objective reality of 'nations' is emphasised. Nowhere does it come to mind that groups --wherever they are to be found --have a strongly subjective basis, that 'nations'such as Lithuania or the Ukraine are defined territorially more than ethnically, and that they are therefore almost without exception multi-ethnic in population structure.
Obvious universality
Such comparisons between Europe and the rest of the world emphasize the universal validity of a nationalist ideology. When criticism of patriotism or nationalism is voiced and reported on, there are clear markers of distance between the opinions described and a more general public opinion. E.g. in a review of Peter Glotz's "Der Irrweg des Nationalstaats" we read:
"[According to Glotz] Das Geschichtsbild mtisse europdisiert und Mehrsprachigkeit zum Bildungsprinzip gemacht werden. Kess spricht er von einer'Hollandisierung Deitschlands' --ein Nationalbewusstsein ohne jeden Bezug zu volkischen , rassischen oder Sprachlichen Elementen. Schon war's. Das soll kein Spott sein. Es sind solche Argumente, die Glotz in seinem querkopfigen, anregenden, eigensinnigen Essay auch dazu bringen, ftir Bonn als Regierungssitz zu pliidieren."(Die Zeit, Nov 9 7990, p. 16) [our historical perspective should <according to Glotz> be Europeanized, and multilingualism should be made an educational principle. He speaks boldly of the 'Hollandization of Cermany' --a national consciousness without reference to people, race or linguistic elements.
Wouldn't that be nice! And this is not even meant ironically. It is this type of argument that also leads Glotz, in this stubborn and highly personal essay, to a plea for Bonn as capital.l Implicit in this is a perception of Holland as a nation untrue to itself because of lack of attention to real national identity and language. Strangely enough, Belgians tend to share this perception with the Germans. Thus the Antwerp mayor Cools takes every possible opportunity to explain that Dutch would have been taken over by Flanders has to look to the north now and in the future: 15 million carries more weight than 5 million. But for language policies the situation is different. There Flanders will simply have to assume its modest pioneering role. In Flanders one sees the need for the preservation and spread <of Dutch>, for Holland this is still a dubious matter.]
Needless to say that the perception reflected in the above German and Belgian texts bears only on Dutch official rhetoric. Our data show that 'the view from below' is not so different after all, and that the Germans and the Belgians can rest assured that nothing emanating from Holland will disturb their universally valid principles of social and political organization. Unfortunately, this cannot be meant ironically either.
Language in the Empire
Language as a battlefield
Our data indicate that language creates identity and discontinuity. It unites and it divides. In the context of conflicts involving nationalist groups in Europe (and elsewhere), these opposite tendencies turn language into the target and the battlefield of interethnic strife. Since language is a distinctive feature of 'natural' groups, and since it is an element of divisiveness between such groups, language can also be used as an object of oppression and discrimination in contexts where interethnic differences are not (or no longer) tolerated. Dominant in the framing of this role of language is the metaphor of the 'Empire' in connection with tensions between a central government and 'national,' linguistic groups. The 'Empire,' in our corpus, mostly refers to the Soviet Union or to state systems based on the Soviet model. In all the examples found in our data, the tensions between the 'Empire' and national or ethnic groups are presented as resulting from the systematic denial by the empire of legitimate linguistic, cultural, and political rights. These minority groups claim the right to use their own language (or orthography), or to restore or introduce its official status as 'national language.'
Since language is seen as a natural characteristic of these groups, such rights are held sacred even if the claims are uncompromising and radical in nature. Linguistic discrimination by the Soviet Government is evoked as an example in statements such as: "Their [the Kazakhs'] culture has been so defiled by the Bolshevikhs that many Kazakhs do not even know how to speak any other language than Russian" (Guardian Weekly, 11 Nov. 1990, p. 18) "[...] u native Russian, Gennadi Kolbin, a party apparatchik who spoke not a word of the Kazakh language and had never been to the republic [of Kazakhstan]" (Guardian Weekly, 11 Nov. 1990, p. 18) Soviet oppression is said to have resulted not only in the loss of local language competence among oppressed peoples in peripheral republics. It also resulted in changes in language attitudes and political partisanship:
"The done thing, in the Soviet Ukraine, was to speak Russian if you became educated." (Guardian Weekly, 4 Nov. 1990, p. 9) "They claim that the Gagauz are strongly Russianized; most speak Russian rather than Turkish and support Russian interests." (The Guardian, 1 Nov. 1990, p. 4) The same pattern occurs in Soviet sattelites, or in regimes that have adopted the Soviet model. Serbia's centralist attitude towards the Albanian population of the Kosovo region is such a case:
"The Albanian-language press and radio have been abolished". (International Herald Tribune, 12 Nov. 1990, p. 4) When anti-Soviet nationalist groups, once they have gained autonomy or independence, stretch their nationalist fervor to the point of oppressing other minorities within their (supposedly) national territories, this is explained as a direct consequence of the repression and discrimination they have suffered: In other words, the radicalism of newly autonomous or independent nationalist governments is not a product of their own ideology, but rather an understandable, yet potentially dangerous, reaction to generations-long oppression by the totalitarian imperial authorities. These hyper-nationalist reactions, however, threaten the possibilities of future collaboration among newly autonomous regions: "Lrs violences entre Moldaves et russophones rev€tent un aspect potentiellement explosif pour I'ensemble du pays." (Le Monde 6 Nov. 1990, p. 8) lnre violence between Moldavians and Russian-speakers hides a potentially explosive situation for the country as a whole.]
The new forms of oppression often take the shape of legislation in favor of the majority language, banning other languages: "In return, the republic's [: Moldavia's] government would soften a law that made Moldavian the national language and required people in dozens of occupations to pass tests in Moldavian. The language law has stirred resentment among Russian speakers and the Gagauz." (International Herald Tribune, 5 Nov. 1990, p. 5) "Pour eux [the Slovak hunger strikers protesting against a new language law], cette loi est trop laxiste: elle autorise I'usage des langues minoritaires dans les bureaux et services dans les regions ou les diverses minorites de Slovaquie comptent plus de 207o de la population locale." ([, Monde, 1 Nov. 1990 , p. 7) lnor them, this law is too permissive: it allows the use of minority languages in offices and services in regions where the various minorities in Slovakia make up more than zOVo of the local populationl These new forms of oppression are supported by standard nationalist arguments associating national territory with national language. These arguments are, in our data, always presented as direct quotations: Though the ultimate absurdity of this cycle of oppression is not hidden by the reports, the underlying assumption of the legitimacy of each group's preoccupations is never challenged. Natural resistance and democrac"t At an abstract level, these examples invoke the image of an empire, consisting of a wide variety of linguistic, ethnic, religious, and cultural groups, most of which are oppressed by the unitarianism of the central state. Because the empire is oppressive, and because its oppression is directed against features which are absolute, inalienable characteristics of natural groups, the resistance of these groups is seen as necessarily legitimate. The struggle can only be conceptualized in terms of liberation or'freedom' movements.
It is only natural that people revolt when they are deprived of their own language and culture. Consequently, the natural, normal and desired society is one in which these forms of oppression are absent: the nation-state in which people sharing one language, culture, religion and history live together within a sovereign state system. Here again, we find homogeneism as the underlying premisse.
The argument in favor of homogeneism remains complex and often obscure. In relation to Eastern Europe, it is blended with the discourse of anti-communism. The 'natural resistance' movements are directed against (the remnants of) communist rule. By a remarkable and largely implicit rhetorical twist, which defines communism as against human nature, East-European nationalism thus becomes an equivalent of democratization. The linguistic and cultural liberation of the EastEuropean peoples is at the core of the political liberation of the communist world, because nationalist revolt in the communist empire is aimed at liberating the 'natural'human group from unnatural communist rule.e
In other contexts (such as the 'giant empire' India, or minority problems in Belgium), the argument is stripped of its anticommunist connotations, and reduced to its supposed 'naturalness' or 'normality.'The backbone of the argument is thus the sole assumption that different people do not like to live together, and that successful society-building requires as high a degree of similarity as possible among the people. The conceptual problems involved should be clear. First, homogeneism as a view of society rules out a number of social considerations. Class difference, socioeconomic status, or social mobility do not come up as factors of social coherence or conflict, except as properties of complete groups which correspond to the 'natural' criteria for identifying and separating them in the building of a peaceful, harmonious society. This is, to say the least, a partial picture obscured by --admittedly persuasive but necessarily mistaken --monocausalism. Second, the direct association of (homogeneistic) nationalism with democracy and freedom is certainly not warranted by the facts, neither synchronically nor historically. Nationalism has been a notorious cause of conflicts, and has led to some of the worst events in history. Also, the 'liberated'Moldavians and Kazakhs or Slovaks, as well as the liberated East-Germans, seem to be building a track record of oppression and racism against minorities. Every minority has its own minorities. And for members of minority groups, be they immigrants in Western Europe, or Gagauz people in Moldavia, the 'national' government may be as bad as the empire, because in both cases very little attention is given to their linguistic, cultural or whatever rights. Only the structural level of the debate has shifted. Nothing has been achieved to guarantee more democracy in a pluralist sense.
Multilingualism and tolerance
Still, nationalism is seen as a'natural'development anchored in linguistic and ethnic identities, a powerful liberation movement, the excesses of which are based on anger and frustration. Our data suggest an intriguing side-aspect of the role of language in this process. In three articles, two about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Israel and one on Serbian nationalism, reference is made to individual multilingualism as the opposite of fanaticism. The intriguing point is that this reference is made in a negative sense: even tolerant individuals who speak several languages fluently become fanatics. The orthodox bishop of Serbia, Amphilochios, a Serbian extremist, is said to speak fluent German (Frankfurter Allgemeine 6 Nov. 1990, p. 16 The picture that emerges here is the following. The struggle for legitimate national rights is such a central human interest that it eclipses even 'intelligent'and practical solutions, such as learning the language of one's counterpart. That means that a conflict between people based upon nationalist feelings is a fundamental conflict, one which cannot be remedied by slight forms of accommodation between the parties involved. In these references to the failure of individual multilingualism as a solution to interethnic conflicts resides a powerful suggestion about the nature of nationalism. It appears as both an emotional irrational matter and as a respectable phenomenon. The shortcomings of language learning, or education at large, as potential solutions for interethnic conflicts demonstrate that nationalism is based on the fundamental, natural, need for a homogeneous society. Man's political instinct, so to speak, directs him towards homogeneism. Quid erat demonstrandum.
Conclusions
Our corpus displays a remarkable consistency with regard to these assumptions. Homogeneism seems to be a widespread ideological premise, underlying much of the opinions reflected in or guided by the European newspaper press. We find a primitive political theory underlying seemingly trivial statements and suggestions about the role of language in nationalism. This theory revolves around the impossibility of heterogeneous communities, and the naturalness of homogeneous communities, the Volk. This theory also rationalizes anticommunism, not in terms of an ideological critique, not even in terms of an economic critique, but in terms of the supposedly unnatural character of the communist system. Nationalism thus provides the ultimate evidence for the just cause of the Cold War. The Cold War did not concern political-economic details, it was about fundamental, natural rights such as the right to use one's mother tongue. The way in which the role of language in nationalist ideology is presented is largely political. The role of language as an element in feature clusters, corresponding to 'natural', objective political units, which makes it a mobilizing force in interethnic conflicts, obliterates the primarily social dimension of language. language may equally characterize all members of one ethnic group, within that ethnic group its resources may be unevenly distributed along social lines, as so much empirical sociolinguistic work has demonstrated. But the feature cluster of 'culture' or'ethnicity' functions as a powerful frame of reference. lrss romantic (and maybe less easily accessible) factors virtually disappear from the picture, or their relevance is gravely downplayed.
The way in which Ianguage is presented in the overall reporting on nationalist ideologies in Europe reveals a decidedly unsophisticated folli view. Although our analysis in this paper was based on a relatively small set of data, we believe to have demonstrated the usefulness of a systematic search for the 'view from below' by means of a pragmatic analysis of patterns of wording. If applied with methodological rigor to larger sets of data, w€ believe that this type of analysis can provide an empirical tool for the investigation of elusive phenomena such as ideologies, public opinion, and ideas.
If nothing else, this brief study may have revealed a significant discrepancy between an aspect of popular language ideology and the way in which language ii used in multilingual societies. As demonstrated by Woolard (1989) in connection with bilingualism in Catalonia, language choice is highly symbolic and language shift is often motivated by the dynamics of social mobility. In popular ideology (no1 to be confused with public ideology) however, language tends to be a much more fundamental, even natural and inalienable, aspect of ethnicity or group identity in general.
